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The Entrapment Defense
AN INTERVIEW WITH PAUL MARCUS*
Law Review:

Professor Marcus:

Professor Marcus, on behalf of the Ohio Northern
University Law Review, I would like to thank you for
agreeing to sit for an interview. Let me start by asking
you to explain your background briefly. By what
pathways did you become a scholar of criminal law
and procedure?
The short answer is I loved law school. Some people
do not, but I did. And I particularly loved the criminal
law and criminal procedure areas. I clerked for a
federal court in Washington, practiced for a few years
in Los Angeles, and then went into teaching at the
University of lllinois, principally in the criminal law/
criminal procedure area. I began working in the
entrapment area and undercover police surveillance
probably fifteen to twenty years ago. It was an area
that I found important to teach to students and difficult
to teach, and not, in my judgment, a whole lot had
been written in the area. So, I really became involved
in the scholarly part of it. That led me to much more
involvement in the practice area as well. Lawyers and
judges would call and ask me either informally to
participate or formally to handle a case or work on a
case. It led me to do more comparative law work as
well. When I would visit other countries, such as

* Paul Marcus is the Haynes Professor of Law at the College William & Mary Marshall-Wythe
School of Law in Williamsburg, Virginia. This interview with Professor Marcus was conducted at Ohio
Northern University Law School by the Law Review on Friday, September 4, 2003. Professor Marcus
specializes in the areas of the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments, Criminal Law, Criminal Practice,
Entertainment Law, and Intellectual Property.
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Brazil, Malaysia, or Australia, I would ask questions
involving undercover police work and what they did.
What they do overseas is quite different from what we
do in terms of the legal issues here. I wrote a book
called The Entrapment Defense. 1 The first edition
came out fourteen years ago; it is now in its third
edition. I recently re-did it so hopefully I am current
on the law of entrapment and undercover surveillance.
What were the motivating factors along your career
pathway or was the pathway more experiential? Did
you at some point know, O.K., I'm going to dedicate
myself to this area, or did it just happen by serendipity?
A little bit of a combination. Legal research, at least
in my experience, often involves issues that do not
look so complex, but once you start getting into them,
they become far more complicated. They take you
just much, much longer to get into and then other
questions develop. But in addition, I really would get
involved with particular matters on both the prosecution and defense sides and that really fueled me to
know more about the area and to speak and write on it
because I really did have a number of concerns.
A prominent surveillance technique is the undercover
law enforcement sting operation. When I hear that
phrase, I think of movies such as The Sting or The
Untouchables, which evokes a different era. Has the
use of sting operations in the United States been more
or less prominent during certain eras?
Yes, there has been a little bit of an ebb and flow,
clearly in connection with traditional criminal law
prosecutions as opposed to espionage or terrorist
activities. In terms of traditional criminal law activities when there is more of a push for enforcement of
criminal laws that are frankly difficult to enforcenarcotics-trafficking is a prime example of that or in
older days, alcohol restrictions-it is very difficult to
prosecute unless you have an insider. It is very difficult to prosecute the people who are in charge of it.

1. PAUL MARCUS, THE ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE (3d ed. 2002).
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The follow up, and I will mention this although we can talk about it later, I have tried for a
long time to quantify how many of these are going on
out there because in my own experience I can say,
informally, a lot are happening. It is a very, very
common technique. But it is impossible to compile
any empirical evidence and certainly I have not seen
any. Let me explain why that is. There is no unified
law enforcement agency responsible in this area. You
see undercover police operations and stings at all
different levels. In a small city, say one hundred
thousand people, there may well be undercover police
operations regarding prostitution rings-that is pretty
common. At the county level, a little bit larger, with
relatively minor drug offenses-not the national
distributor- you may well have a sting operation with
drug offenses at the county level.
Then we move up to the state level. Many
states are involved in all kinds of undercover operations with respect to consumer fraud, securities transactions at the state level, certainly statewide drug
prosecutions, investment scams . . . . So even before
we talk about the federal undercover work in this area,
there are enormous numbers in all fifty states plus the
District of Columbia. Well, having said that, we then
tum to the federal agencies. I have seen matters in
which the DEA-the Drug Enforcement Administration-was involved, the FBI, postal inspectors, securities investigators, treasury department people, immigration officers-so you have all these agencies
having little to do with one another and they are all
engaged in this technique, which again can be effective or not but is viewed as an important part of the
law enforcement arsenal.
In terms of importance, you just mentioned the
breadth of areas in which the sting operations can be
used and you did anticipate the follow up as to
measuring the frequency of sting operations, how
important are they and what benefits do they provide
to law enforcement officials?
It is controversial. There are strong supporters and
harsh detractors. I am somewhere between the two.
The supporters argue that these undercover operations
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are absolutely essential. There are some crimes run by
organized crime-with small letters I do not mean it's
necessarily mafia run, but multiple party crimes where
you must penetrate the group. Their view is: If you
want to find the person who is a distributor of narcotics or who has a nationwide consumer scam, the only
way to do it is to get involved with the criminal
endeavor. To do that, we must send in undercover
agents to buy or to sell-to become part of the operation-and that is how you break the crime ring.
The detractors contend stings are very expensive. You have to have people specially trained and if
you do not, you will have big problems. You have to
have people who are specially trained. It becomes
their life for a time and they have to be monitored very
carefully. Even so, the success rate is not always
wildly high. It is uneven. The critics would say on
the rare occasion it makes sense but as a general rule,
traditional law enforcement is better. It is cheaper and
it is more effective.
I fall somewhere in between. I believe that
the entrapment undercover operation creates a problem. Often law enforcement departments are illadvised to pursue this, certainly as a first resort,
because it is expensive and it is uneven. And often the
legal questions are litigated. And they are difficult
and expensive to litigate so I think the critics have a
point. On the other hand, I have been personally
involved with cases where it was clear to me that you
could not eliminate at least a major part of the problem unless you had an undercover operation. It is just
not something you can do with search warrants or
even wire taps because [of] these criminal organizations-again not necessarily the biggest ones but even
the sort of "mom and pop" organization where it is
very hard to get anyone, except the smallest fish in the
sea, without an insider.
You mentioned some of the risks that are inherent in
the use of sting operations. What legal restrictions
exist to curtail some of those risks?
The principal one is the entrapment defense. But let
me at least mention a couple of the others. In the
extreme situation-and this is very unusual, but it can
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happen-in the extreme situation, there can be a due
process violation. If the government agents are so
involved in the criminal endeavor from beginning to
end-they have organized it, they are intertwined in
it-there are courts who will say that situation is
shocking to the conscience. That test goes back to an
old Fourth Amendment case Rochin v. Califomia 2which most people have had in criminal procedure, the
stomach pump case. There, Justice Frankfurter said
the government action was shocking. We are not
going to condone it no matter what else is present.
And there are such cases. It does not happen very
often happily. Now I will say there are some courts in
the U.S., including one right here in this area, the
Sixth Circuit, who do not believe that there is a due
process defense. I think they are wrong. While the
Supreme Court has never so held, there is certainly
strong dicta that would indicate it. Moreover, it
would be a sad day, indeed, if we would say behavior,
which was otherwise shocking, could be allowed.
There are Fourth Amendment restrictions
here as well under traditional search and seizure principles. That is, if you have an undercover agent involved, she can elicit information in terms of conversations, she can certainly testify to what she observes,
[and] testify to what evidence is given to her, but she
cannot engage in searches that are not otherwise
permitted by the Fourth Amendment. I will give you
an example. If she is at a meeting at someone' s house,
and she is the undercover agent, she can testify as to
what people said, she can testify to her seeing money
changing hands-that sort of thing. But, when they all
go in the other room, she cannot rummage through the
dresser drawers or the kitchen cabinets because clearly
she is a government agent and she needs a warrant to
search a house. That, too, is not going to happen terribly often. The evidence normally is given to her, to
that agent, as part of the whole operation.
The real limitation here is the entrapment
defense. The entrapment defense is used a lot. Here,
2. 342 u.s. 165 (1952).
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there has been a real shift in how successful it has
been. It is hard to gauge empirically. But from the
reported cases, and the cases I have been involved
with over the last dozen years, we have seen major
changes in the way the defense gets raised and frankly
how successful it is.
You mentioned some recent developments. What is
the historical genesis for the entrapment defense in the
United States?
The entrapment defense is unlike any other defense
that we have. If one thinks back to ftrst year criminal
law, traditional defenses, such as self-defense, defense
of others, necessity, and the insanity defense-that
sort of claim in our system comes from the early
English common law. They have been around for
literally hundreds of years. Now we may view defenses a little bit differently than the English did two
hundred to three hundred years ago, but the core of
those defenses remains. That is not true with the
entrapment defense.
The entrapment defense does not come from
the English common law. The English do not have it
even today. This defense developed about one hundred years ago in the United States in cases in which
the courts began to be concerned with creation of
crime by government agents. There was a big push
during prohibition with regard to government agents
becoming heavily involved in setting up alcohol
operations essentially so that they could then bust
those same alcohol operations. The defense has become an absolutely accepted and important part of our
criminal justice system. Even though in most states it
is not by statute, all states have it. And there is
certainly a federal entrapment defense, even though it
is not constitutionally based and even though it is not
linked to the English common law.
You mentioned some differences between the federal
use of the entrapment defense and the states' use.
Could you further explain some of the differences
between jurisdictions' use of the entrapment defense?
Because the entrapment defense is not constitutionally
based, states are free to do whatever they want-much
the way self-defense would not be viewed as constitu-
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tionally based. But with something like self-defense,
basically it is the same defense in all fifty states and
the District of Columbia. There are some nuances
with respect to evidence or jury instructions, but
basically it is the same defense. With the insanity
defense, there are some variations on the theme but
the basic issues are similar in most states. That is not
true with entrapment.
There are really two basic defenses of entrapment. And then, there is a third one, which blends the
two. The earliest and still majority rule on entrapment
is referred to as the subjective test. This test was
developed by the United States Supreme Court.
Again, it is not constitutionally based so the states do
not have to follow the Supreme Court. But, of course,
many states, including the State of Ohio, would just do
so as a general course and because they believe it is
the better way to go. The subjective defense focuses
on the individual himself, and says basically the
legislature could never have intended that someone
who is free of culpability in terms of any kind of bad
state of mind ought to be criminally punished. As a
consequence, we will look at that suspect's personal,
subjective state of mind and ask one key question:
Prior to the time when the government tried to engage
him, or when they solicited him, did he have a predisposition to commit the crime? Was he likely to do it
on his own, wholly apart from the government? If the
answer is yes, he was so disposed, we are not going to
much care about what the government involvement
was, so the line goes, because this person is culpable.
If the answer is no, he was not so disposed, then he
ought not to be prosecuted at all. The federal government uses this test. It was promoted heavily by an
interesting collection of Justices, including Chief
Justice Warren and Chief Justice Rehnquist-and
those [two] are two who are not terribly alike in the
criminal justice area generally. A majority of states
would follow this, though some of our very largest
states do not. California, Texas, Pennsylvania, and
Michigan do not. So there are a number of important
states who would not choose to follow the subjective
standard.
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The second test is called the objective standard. This was promoted most heavily by Justices
Frankfurter, Stewart, Marshall, and Brennan-again
not a group you normally think of together. Their
view was that the basis stated for the subjective testthat the legislature could not have intended nonculpable people to be found responsible-is nonsense.
They asserted that the reality was the legislature never
thought of any of this. If they had, they would have
created a statutory defense. All the legislators did in
a drug offense, for instance, was define the crime, give
the elements of the crime, and the punishment. So
their view was essentially-let us be honest about
it-the real reason to have an entrapment defense ...
it is as a judicial curb on extreme law enforcement
behavior. And, because what we are trying to do is
have the judiciary limit the executive here, we ought
to be honest about what the test is. The test is not who
is the defendant, or what did she believe, or whether
she was disposed. But the real question ought to be
what did the police do. Was that police behavior so
extreme that we are willing to say [that] we toss out
the conviction in order to alter behavior by the police?
It is viewed as an objective test because what we say
is: Look at a reasonable person standard, if the behavior of the police was such that it might have caused a
reasonable person to violate the law--one who would
otherwise not violate the law under these circumstances-that behavior is improper. Objectively, we
say that is too extreme and we are going to strike
down the conviction.
The last set of states-and there are some of
these but not very many--essentially blend the two
tests together. The norm here is to say Part One is a
question of law for the judge: Was the government
behavior too extreme? And if the answer to that is
yes, then that ends the inquiry. Then it is a good
defense. If the answer to that is no, or at least it is
debatable, then give the matter to the jury, the question of whether this defendant was predisposed to
commit the crime.
In terms of the subjective/objective tests, it seems
analogous to the nature/nurture debate as some juris-
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dictions have answered the question somewhere in
between the two poles. What do you see as the pros
and cons of each test, and which one would you
prefer?
I prefer a blended test, but I am not sure I would have
it as a sort of bifurcated analysis. I like where the
Supreme Court has gone with its test as I will explain
in a moment.
The subjective test has a tremendous benefit
which is that we really look at the individual defendant. The central notion of our criminal justice system
has always been individual culpability. So if she
really was predisposed to commit the crime, then there
is something to be said for prosecuting her and not
allowing an affirmative defense. The problem with
that, however, is that identical police conduct in two
different cases can net two distinct results because
we have two unique defendants. One must wonder
whether that is a sensible criminal process where
exactly the same behavior by the government yields
two quite different results. The second part of the
problem with the test is: How do you prove predisposition? Often the way to prove predisposition is to
look at prior criminal activities. We know in our
criminal justice system we typically do not allow [it].
There are some exceptions, but typically we do not
allow prior crimes by this defendant to demonstrate
propensity-likelihood that the charged crime has
occurred. We do not do that for good reasonbecause the person is on trial for what he did today,
not what he did five years ago. But with entrapment,
we allow evidence of prior crimes because what better
indicator is there of predisposition? If a person has
done this four times over the past ten years, [by] the
fifth time; he was probably disposed to commit it. So,
it is very troubling. We wonder about prosecuting
someone for prior times even though the jury is
instructed that it is not for propensity-it is only to
determine predisposition. That is a pretty fine line, I
think, to instruct a lay jury on.
With the objective test, we are more honest
that what we are trying to do here is: Determine
appropriate police behavior. Certainly, mainstream
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police activity is not really affected here. So the real
benefit is we look at the government behavior and we
ask the serious questions. There are two problems
with this however. One is: How do you judge that?
We are talking about a reasonable person who would
be compelled to commit a crime, but the whole notion
of the criminal justice system is that reasonable people
are not compelled to commit crimes unless they are
coerced-unless they are saving someone' s life- and
we already have defenses for that. And the second
part ... again, the flip side of the predisposition test:
Do we really want to have a standard dealing with the
reasonable person? Shouldn't we be measuring
individual culpability? Now it seems to me the
Supreme Court here has done a pretty good job
because the Justices have retained the majority subjective test so predisposition is still the test. But what
they have said is: We are going to look carefully at
two things. First, what is predisposition? Just because a person has a predilection for this type of
activity does not mean a predisposition. The real
question is: Whether he would have engaged in the
criminal behavior, which is different. And second, we
are going to rely much more heavily on an analysis of
the government's behavior. If the government engaged in extensive and intensive inducement, that is a
good sign that the defendant was not predisposed
because it took such extreme inducement in order to
get him to commit the crime. So, in a way, even
though the Court still retains the predisposition test, it
looks more like a blend because we are putting more
reliance on the government behavior than we ever did
before.
Do you think part of the blending you were referring
to on the predisposition point stems from the notion,
as the Seventh Circuit said in Hollingsworth, 3 that
"predisposition" has both "positional" and "dispositional" elements?
Yes, I think it is. Judge Posner wrote the opinion
there. And I published an article soon afterward

3. Hollingsworth v. United States, 27 F.3d 1196 (7th Cir. 1994).

2004]

Law Review:

ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE

221

praising him because I thought he got the doctrine
exactly right. We were both harshly criticized by
some who said that is not what the Supreme Court
said and that is not what it meant. But I think it is
what the Court meant. It seems to me that the Court
was saying in the important Jacobson case,4 involving
the farmer who was convicted of receiving dirty
magazines through the mail, was to look quite carefully at who this defendant is. Is he likely to have
committed the crime without the government involvement? And I believe that what Judge Posner said is:
When we are told by the Court to look carefully at
who this defendant is, we also want to look closely at
what the government did. What the government did in
Hollingsworth, for instance, was to set up a criminal
enterprise-something that the defendants could not
have done on their own. 5 They were enthusiastic.
They were greedy. They wanted to make money. But
it is no crime to be greedy and to want to make money.
It is not even a crime to want to violate the law. You
have got to take steps to violate the law. What the
Seventh Circuit said was: The defendants had the
disposition-perhaps, the enthusiasm-but they were
not positioned to be able to commit the crime. That
was a case involving financial transactions, offshore
banking, and these defendants were two amateurs.
And these amateurs did not know how to commit this
crime. And because they were not likely to commit it
on their own, as a matter of law-not even as a matter
of fact but as a matter of law-the subjective test has
not been satisfied. And because the government has
the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt-if the
entrapment defense is properly raised in a case like
that-the court found [that] the government could not
prove this crucial factor beyond a reasonable doubt.
You mentioned "as a matter oflaw." And earlier you
mentioned the effort of the judiciary to curtain the
executive branch. It does seem that there are judge/
jury decision maker issues that arise frequently in the

4. Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540 (1992).
5. Hollingswonh, 27 F.3d at 1201-02.
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entrapment context. What are some of the differences
you have seen between how judges and how juries
interpret factual contexts involving potential use of the
entrapment defense?
I see some big differences. Let me step back and give
just a bit of an overview as to what the law is supposed to be, or at least, what I believe the law is
supposed to be. I think the law is that generally in the
subjective test jurisdictions, the jury decides the key
matters. These are fact-oriented questions about what
the state of mind was at a particular time-whether
the person was predisposed or not. In the objective
jurisdictions, most commentators and judges traditionally thought that this ought to be a question generally
for the judge as a matter of law-in order to develop
standards and determine what the extreme reach is.
Having said that, however, the two principles have
gotten jumbled. In a number of cases involving the
subjective standard, we have courts who will say this
issue never should have gotten to the jury. That can
happen one of two ways: there was not enough evidence to demonstrate entrapment, or there was so
much evidence to demonstrate entrapment that it is not
even a triable issue. The Hollingsworth case6 is just
such a case where the court finds entrapment is a
matter of law. But the Supreme Court in Jacobson/
and also in the earlier Sherman case8 involving a
narcotics transaction, the Court said the evidence was
so clear as to lack of predisposition-! think because
of the heavy inducement of the government-that we
decide as a matter of law.
On the other side of that coin, there are a
number of jurisdictions that have objective standard
tests, but give it to the jury to resolve as a question of
fact. So, it is a bit of an oddity because I think the
original proponents for each side believed in a pretty
pure judge/jury split, and it's gotten much less pure in
recent years. Now, having said that, it is most inter-

6. /d. at 1204.
7. Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 540.
8. Shennan v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958).
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esting for me having been involved in both federal and
state cases, and seen a whole lot of them out there in
reported decisions as well. I find judges often reluctant in the entrapment area. They frequently believe,
correctly or not, and sometimes I think it is correct,
that the undercover "tool" used was absolutely necessary, and the defendant was enthusiastic about committing the crime. So we have little sympathy for this
person. The government inducement was pretty heavy,
but that is what you have to do to solve this crime.
There are certainly judges who would disagree with
that, but my experience has been more judges take that
dim view of entrapment.
Juries, I often find, react positively to the
entrapment defense. I think there is a real concern
over government overreaching--over the big brother/
big government . . . the George Orwell 1984J sense
that the government is in every part of our lives and
they can get us started in a criminal behavior and then
end up prosecuting us for that same criminal behavior.
Juries, in addition, do something which I find judges
do not often do. There are exceptions. But in numerous cases, juries put on trial the undercover agents as
much as they put on trial the defendants. By that, I
mean, the defense lawyer will go into who this undercover agent was-in trying to attack her credibility, in
trying to demonstrate that she did a whole lot more to
create the criminal enterprise than she should have,
[and] in trying to demonstrate that she was the dominant figure, not the defendant, in promoting the
criminal offense. There are many cases where the
evidence was quite powerful and the jury acquitted.
Indeed, consider the two most famous of these cases.
John DeLorean, the car maker from years ago, was
tape-recorded in San Diego, I think. He was taperecorded giving the money or taking the money with
drugs, but the jurors were so disgusted with the
involvement of the government agent that they acquitted. In the Marion Barry case, in Washington D.C.,
they did not totally acquit, but he was found guilty of

9. GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (New American Library 1961).
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a minor misdemeanor and had been charged with a
serious drug offense. And I think the later comments
of the jurors made it clear that they were truly upset
with how hard the government informant had pushed
to get Barry to engage in criminal behavior. So, I
think juries can often be more sympathetic than judges
here. Frankly, with all due deference to my judge
friends, I think jurors may understand this issue better
than judges do with the concern that the government
not become the lawbreaker.
You seem to be enthusiastic in terms of the jurys'
analysis of the entrapment issues, but you did mention
earlier maybe there are some exceptions. What are
some of those specifics?
Oh yes, there certainly are exceptions. Understand
that the entrapment defense is not going to work
terribly well with a defendant who has been convicted
of essentially the same crime before. I think juries in
that situation understand quite well that while the
government agent may be pretty sleazy, in order to get
someone with prior offenses, you need someone like
that and they are going to be very unsympathetic to the
entrapment argument. That is on the side of the jury
not reacting well. Let me give you something on the
side with the judge reacting well. The criminal judges
can be quite sophisticated folks who analyze what the
operation was that the government put forth and how
legitimate the argument was as to [the] necessity of it.
But they can be critical as well. There is a federal
case out of Oregon in which the agent was receiving
large sums of money, not taxable sums of money,
based upon arrests, [and] was given no direction and
no definition in terms of what entrapment would be or
how far he could go. And the court was absolutely fed
up with the government explanation. 10 It found entrapment as a matter oflaw. 11 There, the federal judge
clearly understood that the government did not have to
do it this way and had done a lousy job in getting their

10. See United States v. Martinez, 924F. Supp. 1025 (D. Or. 1996), aff'd, 122 F.3d 1161 (9th Cir.
1997).
11. /d. at 1030.
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agent ready and available to participate. 12 So it can go
both ways.
You mentioned earlier the Jacobson 13 and the Sherman14 cases. And certainly there has been a shift in
the Supreme Court's rulings recently-and obviously
the famous shift of Justice Brennan acquiescing to the
changing times. Could you speak to such jurisprudential shifts and also the comparative aspects between the U.S. and other countries you mentioned
earlier?
Sure. Let me separate them. In terms of what had
happened at the Supreme Court, for fifty to sixty
years, there was a real split. It started off as 5-4,
grouping the five led by Chief Justice Warren [and]
now Chief Justice Rehnquist, who promoted heavily
the subjective test for the reasons I mentioned before.
There were always at least three or four dissenters,
Justices Frankfurter, Brennan, Marshall, Stewart, who
said: No, the objective test makes the most sense
because we want to curtail government behavior.
There is currently no one on the Supreme Court today
who, at least openly, challenges the subjective test any
longer. The last dissenter was Justice Brennan who
wrote this rather poignant opinion in the Mathews
case 15-arelativelyminorentrapmentdecisioninvolving inconsistent defenses-saying, in essence, "If I
were writing from a clean slate, I would not use this
subjective test, but I am not. Enough is enough. Stare
decisis says I am on board." That was really the last
gasp and that was well over a decade ago. So, there
really has not been any dissent at the Supreme Court
from the subjective test. There certainly have been
dissents from the application of the test but not the
test itself.
Now on the comparative side of things, it is
striking. I have not seen any country that has anything

Jd.
Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 540.
Sherman, 356 U.S. at 369.
Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58 (1988).
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like what we have in terms of a true entrapment
defense--even with nations that have similar criminal
justice systems. The Australians and the English, for
instance, would say only that entrapment can be
considered by a judge to the extent of limiting evidence-sort of like a mini-exclusionary rule. If the
government was way too involved in retrieving the
gun, then we will exclude the gun but it is not an
affirmative defense. As a practical matter, however,
that gun almost never gets excluded as they also have
discretionary exclusionary rules, which are not often
used, especially with entrapment. So, in the countries
closest to us, there is a possibility that entrapment evidence can be limited, but it is not a very real possibility or, at least, not a possibility seen often. Now in
most other nations--certainly in civil law countriesyou do not see anything like an entrapment defense or
even a limitation. They may try to deal with problems
in other ways, but the reality is that if the elements of
the crime have been shown ... she goes to jail.
Let me tell you that I have had several conversations, both in the United States and in other
countries, with judges, practicing lawyers, and law
professors about this very issue. I had one French
judge speak to me a couple of years ago when I was
talking about both the exclusionary rule and entrapment and the heavy price the government in the United
States has to pay in order to obey the law essentially.
I think his words were something like:
"You Americans are so cynical about your
government and so distrustful of your law enforcement."
I agreed, noting that it is based upon our historical perspective. We are not willing to tolerate
some government actions. But, I said to him, "Surely
you must have problems with these undercover operations if you are trying to deal with narcotics, obscene
materials, and fraud scams-those are areas where
you generally see undercover operations."
He said, "Oh, certainly we have undercover
operations and we have problems of agents going too
far."
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I then asked, "If you are not excluding evidence and you are not allowing an affirmative defense
of entrapment, what do you do to monitor and limit
the government? Do you have job sanctions against
the police?"
And he said, "No, not very often."
"Do you limit the evidence even if you do not
have a defense?"
"No. We do not do that."
"Do you have fines against the police involved?"
He said, "No. We generally do not do that."
And I asked, "Does that mean you generally
do not do anything then in cases involving this kind of
extreme behavior?"
And the answer was, "Yes. We generally do
not do anything."
Do you think an aspect of the "American" notion that
you mentioned is fear of the government acting arbitrarily as applied to a specific individual or a class of
persons? It does seem like even the Jacobson case, 16
for example, that a government official can say: Okay,
you are looking at a certain type of magazine . . . .
And have you seen such fear manifest into reality in
particular cases?
I think it is part fear. I actually have an article coming
out soon where an Australian friend and I compare our
two criminal justice systems. 17 One of the major differences certainly is we are willing to limit government behavior in investigations much more than the
Australians are. And it is hard to explain why that is.
There is this distrust in the U.S. of arbitrary or discriminatory law enforcement, but it is more than that.
We are also fearful of big powerful government,
which seems an oddity because, in the world, the
United States is viewed as the most powerful government. But that is not really true. We may be the most
powerful nation economically and militarily perhaps,

16. Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 540.
17. Paul Marcus & Vicki Waye, Australia and the United States: Two Common Criminal Justice
Systems Uncommonly at Odds, 12 TuL. J.INT'L & COMP. L. (forthcoming 2004).
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but our government is fairly limited in its powers. We
have checks and balances. And we have restrictions
over law enforcement that most other countries do not
have. Entrapment is one such restriction, the exclusionary rule being another, Miranda 18 being another,
and also cases being dismissed under the right to a
speedy trial, strict double jeopardy, and confrontation
rights. And I think all of these are part and parcel of
the notion that the government has a duty and right to
investigate and prosecute but within fairly circumscribed bounds. We want this process quite transpar..
ent so we understand what is going on. And if there is
a price to be paid, it may be controversial, but we are
willing to pay that price of not having successful pro- .
secutions here.
I am shifting gears somewhat since we have a few
minutes left. By looking to the future as lawyers are
predictors, [but] not necessarily good ones, what does
the future hold for the use of those surveillance
techniques, such as undercover sting operations, and
for the responses of the legal system?
I think you have split it apart perfectly. In terms of
what is going to happen, it is pretty clear we are going
to see more of the undercover operations-not less.
Increasingly, they are used in areas where we are
seriously concerned and [are] putting [in] more
resources-these tending to be areas where undercover police operations might work. Those operations
do not work terribly well with violent crime. It is hard
to break into the Hell's Angels or a terrorist cell.
There actually have been few cases involving violent
organized crime. But it is different if we are talking
about narcotics, financial crimes, alien smuggling, and
areas of increasing concern that may have both national and international components. Here, undercover agents may well be effective. I think there will
be more of a push for this type of government activity,
surely at the federal level, but also at the state and
local levels.

18. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

2004]

ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE

229

In terms of the legal response, I have seen
over the last few decades more concerns with the
government overreaching. In a way, the undercover
operation is seductive. It looks like it is low cost.
You plant someone in. You get the whole group, and
wow! What a success! Well, it just does not work
that way. It is expensive. You have to train people
well, the success rate may not be great, sometimes you
win, sometimes you lose, and it is hard to tell ahead of
time. And I see, more and more, juries and judges in
a way that I did not see [them] ten or twenty years ago,
scrutinizing carefully what the government has done
to determine if the government overreached. In the
drug area, there have been cases where the government was really involved-if not in the manufacture
of the drugs, certainly in the operation of the whole
enterprise. I'm thinking of cases where courts have
said: No, that's just too much government involvement. Yes, we will look at the predisposition. But the
language in the opinions is clearly focusing on the
government behavior much more than ever. The use
of the entrapment defense in connection with Internetrelated crimes is increasingly seen, cases involving
obscenity or sexual offenses against minors. These
are serious crimes. But it is an area where there are
real concerns about freedom of speech-the government not being able to be limited in many traditional
ways because you do not have formal meetings and
you are plugging into the Internet. I can think of a
case out of the Ninth Circuit recently in which the
government was just ripped apart by the Court of
Appeals, and I think correctly, for taking what was
seemingly an innocent, though perhaps, bizarre,
sexual encounter and making it into a very serious
sexual offense in a way in which the defendant never
would have intended. 19 The way the court reached
that conclusion was not only focusing on the defendant's state of mind, but again heavily on what the
government had done to promote that state of mind.

19. United States v. Poehlman, 217 F.3d. 692 (9th Cir. 2000).
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Do you think it is fair to say that we might be in for
significant changes in the doctrines involved because,
it seems from listening to you, that some things,
maybe, are becoming obsolete? You mentioned
government overreaching certainly as a pervasive
theme and the idea of the fact that there is such labor
intensiveness involved with entrapment-type sting
operations. But yet with technological advances, it
seems that the involvement of humans in law enforcement's monitoring activities is being superceded by
the use of technology as an ongoing monitoring process to where it seems the line is becoming fuzzy
-whether a shield from government monitoring
exists. Similarly, you mentioned the Internet and the
idea of space being collapsed, and before we talked
about "predisposition" as having a "positional"
element. What do you think of such notions of technological impact on the entrapment defense?
Well, you are right, but only to a limited extent. I say
you are right because I think there are crimes now
where technology helps tremendously in solving the
crimes and getting the culprits-Internet-related
offenses, financial crimes that are done over the wires.
Again, [there is] a real potential for serious problems
because you cannot easily monitor. You cannot see
when they went into that meeting or hear what was
said because nothing was said unless there is an
Internet or e-mail record. I do not think the doctrines
are going to change, but there is going to be closer
scrutiny-again, because of these concerns. Butthere
is another part of it. I probably better address [it] with
the law enforcement community. For a lot of these
crimes, there is no substitute for the kind of good oldfashioned police work we all know about. If you
really want to bust a large narcotics group, a major
alien smuggling ring, [or a] serious financial fraud,
you need to have face-to-face meetings. You have to
become part of the operation. These people simply are
not going to trust you with any serious information
that could, in any way, incriminate the folks who are
running the operations. And for that, I think, you need
the traditional undercover operation-which is why I
think it is going to remain pretty vibrant.
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Do you have any ideas of specific legal issues on the
horizon line that you see as potentially providing the
fodder for landmark or, at least, important court
decisions?
Again, I do not think the central doctrine as to entrapment is going to change that much. It appears that we,
as a country, are reasonably comfortable with that and
even the split between the states is not terribly far as
each one has moved [closer to] the middle. I guess I
would say there are two areas that are ripe for further
consideration and application. The first involves technology much more than ever before, particularly the
Internet, e-mail, and the like, where things are moving
very quickly. It is hard to keep track of things. Yet
we know it has tremendous impact and we have
already begun to see this in terms of upsetting prosecutions involving sexual crimes and minors-as I
mentioned before. So, we are going to see that much
more. The other, and this is [of] most interest, deals
with international issues because these are increasingly common. We are seeing cooperation, happily,
between our government and other countries because
so many of the drug and alien smuggling and financial
crimes are not limited to one nation's boundaries.
Here, we are going to have some difficult issues as to
defenses that can be raised, as to jurisdictions where
you can prosecute [and] who gets to raise the evidence. And we have just begun to see the tip of the
iceberg there. There is much more to come.
For example, maybe [with] the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act or something along those lines where
issues of extra-territoriality are involved?
Yes. I will put in a plug here. I have friends at the
United States Department of Justice-criminal division . . . in the international section-and these are
issues they are thinking about very seriously. They
are extremely capable people and business is booming
for them.
As a final question, based on your vast experience
working on both sides of entrapment cases, what are
some of your favorite cases or favorite memories
where the issues seemed to be so poignant to you?
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I will mention a few. The first two are reported cases.
The third one, I'll change the facts around because it
is not a reported case and I was not officially on
record. One involves a case where the government,
for some bizarre reason, believed that drug smuggling
in the northeast corridor was occurring out of the State
of Maine-not a terribly wise belief. There was a
craggy coast for landing and they had a bunch of
undercover agents, who were themselves not pure,
offering $1 million dollars in cash with $100,000
dollars up front to a marina owner to essentially "close
his eyes" while the drugs got delivered and shipped
through there. The jury had little trouble, saying the
marina owner was in bad financial trouble, but he
never would have done this without [the] 1 million
dollars cash. Another was a financial fraud case out
of New York City in which one gets the sense the
defendants were pretty greedy and would have loved
to have made some more money, but did not have a
clue on how to go forward. They did not know how to
convert financial instruments and how to write up the
deal. But there was a government agent involved who
knew exactly how to do all this and showed them
everything to do. And again the jury frowned upon
that-entrapment found, acquittal of all charges.
Then I worked on one several years ago where I
helped a prosecutor in a case involving militia-some
dangerous and violent crimes. This is an exception to
the usual entrapment case where they planted someone
inside the militia, and that is really how they found out
about future crimes. That is one where the entrapment
defense never really got raised. My involvement was
early on-in trying to guide the undercover agents as
to how far they could go. They had to participate
enough to be viewed as an accepted part of the group,
but if they flopped over the line and were too actively
involved, the fear was that the entrapment defense
could be successfully raised. That is very difficult to
do because the agents [were] away for weeks or
months at a time, and they [did] not exactly know
where the criminal endeavor [was] going to be involved. My advice was to go along with the group,
but not to be initiating new endeavors, encouraging
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people into areas they would not have gone into before
that, or coming up with solutions to problems that they
could not solve.

